

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 08895 01 OF 02 251401Z  
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 ACDE-00 CIAE-00  
DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00  
H-01 INR-10 L-03 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02  
SS-15 TRSE-00 AF-10 /088 W  
-----048938 251412Z /41

O 251350Z APR 78  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 0931  
INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY  
AMCONSUL MUNICH PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION USNATO  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
USMISSION GENEVA  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

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USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: N/A  
TAGS: PARM, SALT, UNGA, PEPR, UR, US  
SUBJECT: BREZHNEV KOMSOMOL CONGRESS SPEECH - FOREIGN  
POLICY ASPECTS

SUMMARY: BREZHNEV'S APRIL 25 ADDRESS TO THE KOMSOMOL CON-  
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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 08895 01 OF 02 251401Z

GRESS CONTAINED A LONG SECTION DEVOTED TO SOVIET FOREIGN  
POLICY. THE MAIN POINTS FOLLOW:

-- HE WAS POSITIVE ABOUT THE STATE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS  
AND ABOUT THE VISIT OF SECRETARY VANCE TO MOSCOW;  
  
-- THERE WAS SOME FORWARD MOVEMENT ON SALT AND AN AGREEMENT

IS POSSIBLE, HE SAID, BUT THE U.S. STILL HOLDS SOME POSITIONS WITH WHICH THE USSR CANNOT AGREE;

-- HE DECLARED THAT THE USSR WOULD NOT PRODUCE THE NEUTRON BOMB AS LONG AS THE U.S. DID NOT;

-- IN WHAT APPEARS TO BE AN SSOD PLATFORM, HE URGED A FOUR PART "PROGRAM" AIMED AT A "COMPLETE STOP TO ANY FURTHER QUALITATIVE OR QUANTITATIVE GROWTH OF THE ARMAMENTS AND ARMED FORCES OF STATES WITH LARGE MILITARY POTENTIAL;"

-- HE ANNOUNCED THAT THE USSR WOULD "JOIN" THE LANFZ;

-- HE ALSO REASSERTED IN VERY STRONG LANGUAGE THE LEGITIMACY OF SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN THE THIRD WORLD WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA;

-- HE COMMENTED POSITIVELY ON THE NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE IN MBFR BUT WAS CRITICAL OF THE WESTERN POSITION AS STILL "ONE-SIDED." END SUMMARY

1. BREZHNEV TOOK THE OCCASION OF HIS LENGTHY SPEECH TO THE KOMSOMOL CONGRESS APRIL 25 TO MAKE A MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY ADDRESS WHICH HIGHLIGHTS SOME OF THE MAIN CONCERNS AND ATTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP FOR THE NEAR TERM IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES WERE FRONT AND CENTER, FOLLOWED CLOSELY BY PRONOUNCE-LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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PAGE 03 MOSCOW 08895 01 OF 02 251401Z

MENTS OF IMPORTANCE ON AFRICA AND SOVIET POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD. THE FOLLOWING STRIKE US AS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN POLICY POINTS (WE ASSUME DEPARTMENT HAS FULL TASS/FBIS TEXT):

2. U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS: ALTHOUGH THE TONE IS MEASURED AND NOT OVERLY OPTIMISTIC BREZHNEV'S FIRST PUBLIC ASSESSMENT OF BILATERAL RELATIONS SINCE HIS VLADIVOSTOK SPEECH OF APRIL 7 REPRESENTS A NOTEWORTHY SHIFT TOWARD THE POSITIVE. THESE RELATIONS, ACCORDING TO BREZHNEV, "DESPITE THEIR FLUCTUATIONS," ARE NOW, "IN A NEW WAY, MORE FAVORABLE TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE." THIS SHIFT IS CLEARLY EVIDENT IN HIS REMARKS ON SALT. "AS A RESULT" OF THE VISIT OF SECRETARY VANCE "WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN MOVING FORWARD SOMEWHAT TOWARDS A SALT AGREEMENT," HE SAID. NEVERTHELESS, HE CAUTIONED THAT NOT ALL PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN SOLVED AND THERE ARE SOME U.S. POSITIONS "WITH WHICH WE CAN IN NO WAY AGREE". HE REASSERTED HIS BELIEF, EXPRESSED IN VLADIVOSTOK, THAT AN AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE, BUT THIS TIME HE USED EVEN MORE POSITIVE TERMS: "I BELIEVE THAT BY MUTUAL EFFORTS ON THE BASIS OF WISE AND REALISTIC COMPROMISES, WE CAN COMPLETE THE WORKING OUT OF AN AGREEMENT." MISSING IS THE NOTATION THAT ALL IS UP TO THE U.S., OR THAT THERE ARE FORCES WORK-

ING AGAINST AGREEMENT WHICH ARE CAUSING "VACILLATIONS" AND  
"CONTRADICTIONS" ON THE U.S. SIDE. HE HAS LAID DOWN A  
MARKER, HOWEVER, THAT THE TWO SIDES ARE FAR APART ON SOME  
ISSUES.

3. NEUTRON BOMB. BREZHNEV HAS GIVEN THE SOVIET RESPONSE  
TO THE DECISION OF PRESIDENT CARTER -- WHICH HE CALLS A  
"HALF-STEP" -- TO DELAY THE PRODUCTION OF THE ER/RB WEAPON,  
BY DECLARING THAT THE USSR WILL NOT PRODUCE IT AS LONG AS  
THE U.S. DOES NOT. THUS, HE HAS PLACED HIMSELF IN THE  
POSITION OF RESPONDING TO THE U.S. WITHOUT ABANDONING THE  
SOVIET POSITION THAT THE ER/RB WEAPON IS NOT PUBLICLY

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 08895 02 OF 02 251408Z  
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H-01 INR-10 L-03 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02  
SS-15 TRSE-00 AF-10 /088 W  
-----048991 251411Z /43

O 251350Z APR 78  
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NEGOTIABLE FOR OTHER WEAPONS DEVELOPMENTS ON THE SOVIET SIDE. HE, INDEED, REAFFIRMED THE SOVIET OFFER TO MUTUALLY RENOUNCE PRODUCTION BY NOTING THAT THE U.S. HAS "UNFORTUNATELY, NOT YET AGREED TO OUR PROPOSAL," THUS INDICATING THAT IT IS STILL ON THE TABLE.

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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 08895 02 OF 02 251408Z

4. DISARMAMENT PACKAGE: IN WHAT IS CLEARLY A PACKAGE OF FOUR PROPOSALS FOR USE IN THE SSOD NEXT MONTH BREZHNEV DUSTED OFF A NUMBER OF OLD SOVIET PROPOSALS AND ADDED SOME NEW ONES WHICH HE PUT FORWARD "FOR DISCUSSION". THE FOUR ARE:

- TO STOP THE PRODUCTION OF ALL TYPES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS;
- TO STOP THE PRODUCTION "AND TO BAN" ALL MDW;
- TO STOP DEVELOPING "NEW TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS OF GREAT DESTRUCTIVE POWER;"
- TO RENOUNCE THE EXPANSION OF ARMIES AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS INCREASES BY PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UNSC AND OF "THOSE COUNTRIES JOINED TO THEM IN MILITARY AGREEMENTS."

5. LANFZ: BREZHNEV APPEARS TO HAVE DECLARED SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO SIGN THE TREATY OF TLATELOLCO PROTOCOL II. WITHOUT MENTIONING THE PROTOCOL BREZHNEV SAID THAT THE USSR WISHES TO "JOIN" THE AGREEMENT AND THAT IT WILL, "LIKE OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS," RESPECT THE ZONE AND REFRAIN FROM THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST ALL STATES WHICH ARE PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT. THIS APPEARS TO BE A CAREFULLY WORDED STATEMENT TRYING TO MIX SUPPORT FOR THE TREATY AND YET AVOID DISTURBING SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE CUBANS, WHO ARE NOT SUPPORTERS OF THE TREATY AND HAVE NOT SIGNED IT.

6. SOVIET THIRD-WORLD POLICY: BREZHNEV TOOK THE OCCASION OF HIS SPEECH TO ASSERT IN THE STRONGEST WORDS WE CAN RECALL HIM USING, THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL CONTINUE IN THE SAME MANNER AS IN THE PAST TO ASSIST THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES TO MAINTAIN THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND REPEL AGGRESSION. AFTER CONDEMNING "IMPERIALISTIC INTERFERENCE" IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER STATES, BREZHNEV PRAISED SOVIET POLICY IN ETHIOPIA IN "DEFENSE OF THE TERRITORIAL

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PAGE 03 MOSCOW 08895 02 OF 02 251408Z

INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE" OF THAT COUNTRY. HE REFERRED TO SUCH ACTIVITY BY THE SOVIET UNION AS A MAIN ELEMENT OF . DETENTE AND OF STRENGTHENING PEACE IN THE WORLD, NOT ONLY

IN EUROPE, BUT IN AFRICA, ASIA, AND LATIN AMERICA. HE  
CLOSED THIS PASSAGE WITH A FIRM STATEMENT THAT "IF  
ANYONE THINKS THAT WITH THE HELP OF SLANDEROUS FABRICATIONS  
AND THREATS THAT THE SOVIET UNION CAN BE DEFLECTED FROM  
THIS COURSE HE IS MISTAKEN."

7. MBFR AND CTB: BREZHNEV RESPONDED WITH A MODERATELY  
POSITIVE REFERENCE TO THE RECENT WESTERN PROPOSAL IN THE  
MBFR TALKS. HE DECLARED THAT THE PROPOSAL "TOOK ACCOUNT"  
OF THE POSITIONS OF THE "SOCIALIST STATES" TO SOME EXTENT  
BUT THAT THE "IMPRINT" OF THE WEST'S ATTEMPTS TO GAIN ONE-  
SIDED ADVANTAGES REMAINS IN THE WESTERN POSITION. HE RE-  
PEATED THE SOVIET CALL FOR A NO INCREASE IN "TROOPS AND  
TANKS" ON EITHER SIDE. ON CTB BREZHNEV EXPRESSED HIS  
TANKS" ON EITHER SIDE. ON CTB BREZHNEV EXPRESSED THE HOPE  
THAT THE TALKS ON THE CESSATION OF "NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS"  
COULD CONCLUDE QUICKLY AND SUCCESSFULLY , GIVEN THE EVIDENT  
PROGRESS LATELY. -

8. OTHER ASPECTS OF SPEECH AND ATMOSPHERICS FOLLOW SEPTEL.  
TOON

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** SALT (ARMS CONTROL), SPEECHES, CENTRAL LEGISLATURE, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 25 apr 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
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**Disposition Remarks:**  
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**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** N/A  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
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**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
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**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
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**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 2859944  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
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**TAGS:** PARM, PEPR, UR, US, UNGA, (BREZHNEV, LEONID I)  
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**Type:** TE  
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**Review Markings:**  
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